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ABSTRACT
 
The objective of the paper is to make an exploratory assessment of the 
impact of the G-3 free trade agreement on member countries' agricultural 
trade. To fulfill this objective, empirical estimates of changes in the 
structure of agricultural trade for four products traded between partner 
countries are obtained by means of a static, single-commodity, partial 
equilibrium trade model. Estimated variables refer to the volume of trade 
flows and their corresponding market shares and to economic welfare 
effects on producers, consumers, and tax payers. 
Simulations are generated for the current provisions of the agreement and 
for an hypothetical tariff elimination applying to the products selected for 
the analysis. The results of the research indicate that the current status of 
the agricultural provisions of the G-3 make the agreement unlikely to have 
a important impact on member countries agricultural trade. Furthermore, 
they show that even if complete tariff elimination were achieved, the 
potential of the agreement to produce substantial changes in member 
countries agricultural trade and to bring meaningful economic welfare 
effects is rather limited. The apparent reason for this outcome is the low 
level of agricultural trade that exists among partner countries in the pre­
agreement period. Unilateral tariff reductions accomplished in each of the 
member countries prior to the establishment of the agreement also playa 
role in determining this result. 
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Introduction 
The general objective of this paper is to provide a preliminary assessment of 
the impact of the G-3 Free Trade Agreement on member countries' 
agricultural trade. To reach this objective an empirical exploratory 
evaluation of the impact of the G-3 on agricultural trade flows, market 
shares, and economic welfare for four selected products was carried out by 
means of a single-product, static, non-spatial, partial equilibrium simulation 
trade model. 
The results of the research suggest that in its current status the G-3 may 
perform poorly in liberalizing agricultural trade and may have a very 
limited effect on the trade structure and economic welfare of member 
countries. These findings confirm the conclusions of the qualitative 
evaluation of the G-3's agricultural provisions by Argiiello and Kyle (1996)1. 
Largely as a consequence of the development of the oil industry, the 
agricultural sector is of less economic importance to Mexico and Venezuela 
than it is to Colombia. As of 1993, the share of agricultural trade within total 
trade (imports plus exports) was 18.9 percent for Colombia, 7.5 percent for 
Mexico, and 5.3 percent for Venezuela (Argiiello and Kyle, 1996). However, 
irrespective of the relative importance of agricultural trade for member 
countries, intra-G-3 agricultural trade lacks significance in any case. As 
shown in Table 1, the volume of intra-G-3 agricultural trade is extremely 
-

1 An overview of G-3 member countries agricultural policies and their trade 
structures as well as of the G-3's agricultural provisions is found in this 
paper. 
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low. Therefore, its share within member countries' agricultural trade is 
negligible, amounting to an average 0.2 percent in the cases of Colombia and 
Mexico, and 1 percent in the case of Venezuela between 1989 and 1993. 
Table 1 Intra-G-3 Agricultural Trade ( $ million) 
Importing Country: Colombia
 
Exporting Country: 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
 
Mexico 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.8 3.0
 
Importing Country: Mexico
 
Exporting Country: 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
 
Colombia 4.4 7.6 0.8 1.6 1.5
 
Venezuela 2.0 30.4 1.7 0.4 3.2 
Importing Country: Venezuela
 
Exporting Country: 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
 
Mexico 4.1 3.2 1.2 2.1 4.0
 
Source: V.N. (see References section) 
Relative instability of trade· flows is characteristic of intra-G-3 agricultural
 
trade and is noticeable at the product level. Only a very few products show
 
identifiable patterns in trade flows and a large number do not register
 
commerce at all for some years2• Table 2 shows the average share of the
 
main groups of agricultural products that were traded bilaterally by the G-3
 
partners from 1989 to 19933 and the coefficient of variation for their annual
 
traded values.
 
-

2 There is the possibility that trade flows for certain products become so 
reduced that they do not appear reported on trade statistics. The V.N., for 
example, does not publish trade flows below $100.000. 
3 Groups are defined at the three-digit level of the SITC. 
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Table 2 Main Products in G-3 Agricultural Trade (average 1989-1993)"" 
Trade Between Colombia and Mexico: 
Colombian Imports Mexican Imports 
ASt CV# AS! CV# 
Fish, fresh / chilled / frozen 8.8 187.5 
Shell fish, fresh/ frozen 4.8 n.a. 
Vegetables, fresh/so preserved 5.5 193.2 
Sugar and honey 38.8 37.4 58.6 116.3 
Coffee and substitutes 3.6 144.2 
Spkes 7.3 62.6 
Edible products, nes (098)t 21.9 69.2 
Cotton 17.6 172.6 
Crude vegetable materials 11.2 13.4 6.7 119.1 
Other products 11.7 n.a. 3.5 n.a. 
Total 100 31.3 100 79.6 
Trade Between Mexico and Venezuela: 
Mexican Imports Venezuelan Impts. 
ASt CV# ASt CV# 
Fish, preserved/prepared 3.1 187.1 
Maize, unmilled 10.1 n.a. 
Cereal preparations 6.5 196.0 
Vegetables, fresh/ S. preserved 27.1 111.3 
Sugar and honey 18.0 n.a. 20.1 147.4 
Edible products, nes (098) 3.0 142.5 34.1 64.2 
Unmanufactured tobacco 7.4 n.a. 
Seeds for soft fixed oil 61.1 53.7 
Crude vegetable materials 4.0 44.4 
Other products 0.8 99.5 4.7 260.8 
Total 100 151.7 100 38.5 
"" Percentages 
t Average share for the period 
# Coefficient of variation for the series of traded values 
Source: Arguello and Kyle (1996) - based on U.N. data 
Five groups of products may be selected as representative of G-3's 
agricultural trade on the basis of their importance within bilateral trade 
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flows, their importance within the structure of imports or exports for 
member countries, and their relative permanence in trade. These 
corrrespond to crude vegetable materials, sugar and honey, seeds for soft 
fixed oil, and vegetables (fresh/simply preserved). The traded value of these 
products accounted for an average of 40 percent of G-3's agricultural trade 
during the 1989-1993 period. 
As discussed in Argiiello and Kyle (1996), two out of the six most important 
products included in the four groups afore mentioned are scheduled for 
tariff elimination within the G-3. Two other products benefited from tariff 
reductions (although one of them not completely) with respect to the level 
of regional tariff preferences previously accorded within the LAIA. The two 
remaining products are excluded from trade liberalization, one of them 
(sugar) subject to programmed negotiations. In terms of their relevance in 
aggregate bilateral trade, the products that were included for liberalization 
account for 1.9 percent of trade, while the products that benefited from tariff 
reductions represent 10.3 percent. On the other hand, excluded products 
account for 27.4 percent4. This figures suggest that the G-3 does not have a 
great potential for trade expansion among partner countries. However, only 
empirical verification can help to achieve a more accurate assessment. 
1. An Empirical Inquiry into the Effects of the G-3 
Analyzing the outcome of any form of economic integration scheme is 
• 
largely an empirical issue. In the context of this paper, use is made of a 
4 Adding to the 40 percent share accounted for by the four groups of 
products. 
5 
simple trade model to explore the likely outcome of the G-3 agreement for 
member countries' agricultural trade. Its structure and basic assumptions 
are presented below. 
The model follows the framework of the USDA's SWOPSIM and 
consequently may be characterized as a synthetic, static, non-spatial, multi­
region, partial equilibrium trade model. It is synthetic in that model 
parameters (supply and demand elasticities, elasticities of substitution, and 
price transmission elasticities) are not estimated endogenously but rather 
obtained from other sources. Given its static nature, the model does not 
provide the time path of adjustment; instead trade and welfare implications 
of the trade agreement are obtained after full model adjustment. Being non­
spatial, the model does not take transportation costs explicitly into account; 
however, the structure of trade prices that is employed is expected to reflect 
this variable. An Armington-type specification of the demand function 
allows for the estimation of origin-destination trade flows (required to 
model a free trade agreement) and market shares. Multi-region specification 
is needed since the FTA directly involves at least three regions (Mexico, 
Colombia and ROW - Rest of the World, or Mexico, Venezuela, and ROW) 
and indirectly takes into account trade flows between Colombia and 
Venezuela Oinked by a separate trade agreement) as well as trade flows 
between Mexico and the U.S. (linked through the NAFTA). Finally, the 
model is partial equilibrium so that the effects of the trade agreement are 
emphasized. 
-
• 
The difficulty in obtaining adequate data and empirical estimates of the 
required parameters makes the model relatively fragile in its empirical 
6 
content. For this reason, a single-commodity treatment was preferred over a 
multiple-commodity approach since it allows a better idea of any possible 
bias in the results. If it is assumed that cross-price effects are mostly of the 
substitutive type it is expected that the results of the model (Le. estimated 
trade flows) will be upward biased when competing products are not 
liberalized and the producing country does not have comparative advantage 
in producing the liberalized one and biased downward when it has 
comparative advantage. On the other hand, if the competing products are 
liberalized the results will depend on the competitive position of the 
country with respect to these products. 
The structure of the model is as follows. The set of domestic supply and 
demand equations for each region is specified in a constant elasticity of 
substitution form (CES) and the corresponding trade equation is an identity 
that defines trade as a residual. 
(1)
 
n 
QDij = Lij .. CPijllij n CPkjllikj (2) 
k=l 
QTi =QSi - QDij (3) 
QSi, QDij, and QTi are quantities supplied, demanded, and traded of a 
specific product in one country. 'Product' is defined as a good that is 
produced in a particular country, for instance dry beans produced in ­
Colombia as opposed to dry beans produced in Mexico or Venezuela. 
Subscripts i and k stand for different products of the same kind (as in the 
7 
example before) and subscript j identifies a particular country (n represents 
the total number of countries). Ki and Lij are constants that are calculated to 
fit the base period data. PPi and CPij represent the prices before which 
producers and consumers of product i react in country j while CPkj is the 
consumer price for product k in country j before which consumers react. Ei 
is the own-price elasticity of supply of product i, "ij is the own-price 
Armington elasticity of demand of product i in country j, and llikj is the 
Armington elasticity of substitution between products i and k in country j. 
As mentioned earlier, the Armington-type specification of the demand 
equation is necessary to model FTAs since manipulation of tariff rates on a 
discriminatory basis requires identifying each country's trade flows. Since 
agricultural trade is not usually characterized by product differentiation 
according to firm of origin or by segmented markets, alternative modeling 
approaches are less appropriate than the Armington procedure (Liapis et aI, 
1992). Here, implementation of the Armington approach is done as in the 
USDA's SWOPSIM (Dixit and Roningen, 1986). First, Armington's two­
stage process is modified into a one-stage procedure in which the quantity 
demanded of the good and the respective quantities demanded of the 
products that form this good's market are determined simultaneously. 
Second, own-price and cross-price elasticities for each product are calculated 
making use of Armington's equations in their market share form (an 
expenditure share approach was also developed by Armington). In so doing, 
no actual econometric estimation of these elasticities is necessary, since they 
-

are derived from the values of the own-price elasticity of demand of the 
good and each product's market share while an overall elasticity of 
substitution between pairs of products is assigned a judgment value. 
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Therefore, a single product demand equation that permits substitution 
between all products of a kind, including the one that is produced 
domestically, is used for each region - equation (2) above. 
Price linkage equations relate producer, consumer, and international prices 
and provide the mechanism for introducing policy variables; tariff 
modifications in this case. 
PPi =Ji + CPij (4) 
CPij =Fij + (EXjl .. TPiPAij (5) 
TPij =CPn + TCij (6) 
Ii and Fij are constants calculated to fit the base period data that represent 
the differentials between producer's and consumer's prices in the case of Ji 
and consumer's and trade prices in the case of Fij- Hence, these constants 
reflect the effect of marketing margins and sectoral policies (such as 
producer subsidies and tariffs) on the respective price levels and policy 
changes may be introduced in the model by modifying the value of these 
constants. EXjl represents the exchange rate of country's j currency with 
respect to that of country 1, TPij is the trade price (border price) of product i 
in country j, Aij is the price transmission elasticity for product i in country j, 
and TCij represents international trade costs (mainly transportation costs) 
associated with selling product i in market j. The rest of the variables and 
subscripts are as defined above. 
­
The model assumes that international prices are determined by export 
prices in the country of origin of the product and that border prices are equal 
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to this price plus international trade costs that, in turn, vary according to 
transportation costs. Tariff changes due to the G-3 or other policies implied 
in the analysis (tariff levels determined through the Colombia-Venezuela 
FTA, NAFTA, and Uruguay Round GATT commitments) are modeled by 
appropriately modifying the level of the price wedges (constants Jij and Fij). 
Therefore, the model assumes that domestic marketing margins and other 
support (or discriminatory) measures remain constant during the period of 
analysis. This is done to simplify the empirical requirements of the model 
given the relative unavailability of parameter estimates. 
Finally, the market dearing condition is that excess supply should equal 
excess demand for each product. That is, excess supply of product i must be 
equal to the summation of the demands for product i over the n regions 
n 
QTi =LQDij (7) 
j=l 
In summary, each region's model must have one supply equation (each 
country produces only one product), as many demand equations as 
producing regions of traded products of a kind exist, a net trade equation, a 
producer price equation, as many consumer price equations as producing 
regions of traded products, and the same number of trade price equations. 
On the other hand, each good's model must have as many regions as 
necessary to completely represent actual trade flows; the maximum number ­
of regions in this case is five (Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, U.s., and 
ROW). Additionally, a good's model requires as "many market dearing 
10 
condition equations as producing regions of products of a kind exist; there is 
a market clearing price for each product in the model. The solution 
procedure is based on an iterative adjustment of international prices, such 
that equilibrium levels of these prices (guaranteeing that the market 
clearing conditions are met) are determined for each product. 
As mentioned before, constant terms included in the domestic supply and 
demand equations as well as in the price linkage equations were calclJlated 
to fit the base data~ This process of model calibration assuring that 
equilibrium is reached for the base year (the market clearing conditions are 
satisfied), implies a previous effort in ensuring data consistency. The critical 
aspect of data consistency in trade models is satisfying the condition stated 
in equation (7). Then, other conditions must be examined. Examples of 
these may be the relationship between domestic prices for a producing 
country (at the producer and consumer levels) and the corresponding trade 
(or border) prices for the product in importing countries. Model calibration 
is usually complicated when complex structural relationships are built into 
the model (an illustrative case is provided by models including different 
levels of multiplicative effects). Given the structural simplicity and modest 
size of the model employed here, in spite of being a multi-region model, 
calibration was relatively easy to perform. 
The model outlined above is particularly appealing in that it conforms very 
closely to the standard single-commodity, partial equilibrium analysis in 
­
customs union theory. In this context, measurement of the welfare effects of 
forming a trade agreement can be done by means of estimating changes in 
producer surplus, consumer surplus, and government revenues arising 
11 
from tariff modifications. Estimates of these changes in producer and 
consumer surplus are obtained by calculation of the difference between the 
areas above the supply curve and below the producer price before and after 
tariff changes occur, in the first case, and the difference between the areas 
below the demand curve and above the consumer price level before and 
after tariff changes go into effect, in the second case. Changes in government 
revenues are calculated as the difference between the product of the initial 
ad valorem tariff and the volume of product that is imported at this tariff 
level and the corresponding values of these variables after the FTA is in 
force. Algebraic aggregation of these three values determines whether or not 
the FTA is trade creating in its effect. 
Therefore, equations (1) and (2) can be integrated over PPi and CPij in order 
to obtain estimates of changes in producer and consumer surplus and the 
calculation of changes in government revenues is straightforward. 
PPn 
~PSi = JKi It PPiEi dPPi (8) 
PPiQ 
CPijl n 
~CSij = JLij It CPijllij n CPkjllikj dCPij (9) 
CPijO k=l 
~GRij = Tijl It QDijl It CPijl - TijO It QDijO It CPijO (10) 
12
 
L\PSi, L\CSij, and L\GRij stand for changes in producer surplus, consumer 
surplus, and government revenues, respectively. Subscripts 1 and 0 
represent the periods after and before the FTA and Tij stands for the tariff 
level applied to product i in country j. The rest of variables are as defined 
before. 
The solutions of these integrals reduce to simple algebraic expressions that 
are easily implemented in the solution procedure of the model. The 
derivation of these expressions is presented in Roningen et al (1991) and an 
extensive treatment of measuring economic welfare within the framework 
of SWOPSIM models is performed in Haley and Dixit (1988). The equations 
actually employed for estimating welfare effects on producers and 
consumers are as follows. 
[l/(1+EO] {(PPilQSil - PPwQSW) - PPBi1+Ei [(QSil/PPilEO ­
(QSiO/PPWEi)]) if Ei :I: -1 (11.1) 
PPnQSil [In(PPil) - In(PPBi)] - PPiOQSiO [In(PPiO) - In(PPBi)] 
if Ei = -1 (11.2) 
L\CSi=	 - [1/(1+'110] {(CPilQDil - CPiOQDiO) - CPBi1+'I1i [(QDil/CPil'l10­
(QDiO/CPiO'I1i)]) if 'I1i :I: -1 (12.1) 
L\CSi=	 - (CPnQDil [In(CPil) - In(CPBi)] - CPWQDiO [In(CPiO) ­
-

In(CPBi)]}	 if'l1i = -1 (12.2) 
13 
Where: PPBi =Pshr It MIN (PPiQ, PPn); 0 ~ Pshr ~ 1 and 
CPBi = Pshr It MAX (CPiQ, CPn); 0 ~ Pshr ~ 1 
The modeling approach has a number of advantages. First of all it is simple. 
It is based on straightforward supply and demand schedules linked through 
price and trade balance relationships. It also allows for a clear interpretation 
of the results, and uses a simple mechanism for modifying the required 
parameters. Second, it is consistent and easy to relate to the customs union 
theory. Third, as single-product partial equilibrium, the model 'isolates' the 
effects of the desired policy changes allowing for a straightforward analysis. 
Fourth, selecting an algebraic model may be the only alternative available to 
imposing artificial restrictions on mathematical programming models in 
order to adequately represent actual trade flows. Econometric estimation is 
ruled out or made extremely difficult when time series data are not 
available, are inconsistent from one reporting country to another, or are 
characterized by persistent lack of continuity (due to reasons other than 
those underlying the economic relationships that are modeled). A 
disadvantage of the modeling approach (shared with most trade models) is 
that in the cases in which there are no pre-agreement trade flows, the model 
assumes that they will remain at the zero level in the post-agreement 
period. 
Two major limitations arising from the same source influence the 
reliability of the results. First, the empirical content of the model may be 
weak in that parameter estimates should be regarded as approximations of 
the 'true' parameters. In some cases direct estimates of the parameters were 
used. However, these do not pertain to the same time period as the rest of 
14 
the base data (most of these estimates come from the 1989 SWOPSIM data 
base while base data corresponds to the period 1991-1993). In other cases 
indirect estimates were used based on evaluation of the 'similarity' of 
behavior of the products and/or countries for which there are estimates 
available and those that were required. The second limitation refers to the 
time horizon. Short-term parameter estimates are used while the time 
horizon of the simulation is ten years. It is evident that long-term instead of 
short-term parameters should be used under these conditions; however, no 
long-term estimates were available for many of the required products and 
countries and those available did not provide an adequate basis for an 
informed guess about the (numerous) missing ones. Since long-term supply 
elasticities are usually larger than short-term and long-term demand 
elasticities may be lower or higher than short-term, it is difficult to guess the 
direction of the discrepancy between simulation results employing short 
and long-run elasticity estimates.s Hence, the effects of this limitation are 
unknown. 
Another limitation of the analysis stems from its single-product nature. The 
single-product approach dismisses cross-price effects that may be important 
in assessing the impact of tariff changes on trade flows. Therefore, results of 
single-product models tend to be biased upward or downward depending on 
the relationship between the products (complementary/substitutive) and 
their tariff status. However, whenever there is a lack of reliable estimates of 
the corresponding cross-price elasticities of supply and demand, working in 
-

5 As a reference, Gardiner and Carter (1988) provide an overview on the 
estimation and use of elasticities in international agricultural trade and its 
related problems. 
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a multi-product framework may be less illuminating than completely 
dropping the cross-price effects. 
2. Product~ Analyzed 
To keep this exploratory analysis as simple as possible a group of products 
was chosen on the basis of its relative importance within each country's G-3 
bilateral agricultural trade during the period 1989-1993 and the availability 
of the information required by the trade model. As representative of trade 
flows from Mexico to Colombia the fourth largest traded group of products, 
peppers, was selected. It corresponds to spices, peppers being the only 
subgroup traded. Non-carded and non-combed cotton, the second largest 
traded group in the case of trade flows from Colombia to Mexico was also 
selected. Having the same relative importance within trade flowing from 
Mexico to Colombia, the group dry leguminous vegetables was included in 
the analysis. Finally, sesame seed, the most important export from 
Venezuela to Mexico was selected. Data sources are reported in Appendix 1. 
As a group, these four products accounted for an average of 19 percent of G­
3's agricultural trade during the period 1989-1993 (almost 49 percent if the 
group sugar and honey is excluded). The products selected yield appropriate 
measures of the impact of the G-3 on agricultural trade flows regardless of 
the fact that some of them do not record the highest share in their category. ­
This is due to two reasons. First, model results are obtained in relative 
terms. Measurement of production, consumption, price, and welfare effects 
is calculated as a percentage change over the base year situation (in the case 
16 
of welfare effects as a percentage change over the value of trade for the base 
year). Second, the products that have been traded within the G-3 group are 
homogeneous in terms of their relative importance in member countries' 
agricultural trade. Even in the cases in which this is not strictly true (e.g. 
sugar), historically the share of intra-G-3 trade has been low. 
Trade among G-3 partner countries will be affected by the G-3 agreement 
itself, the commitments arising from the GATT's Uruguay Round, and the 
NAFTA. Therefore, three scenarios are considered in the simulation. In the 
first one, changes in trade flows and economic welfare are calculated for the 
hypothetical case in which there is no G-3 agreement but countries reduce 
their tariffs by at least 15 percent, according to their commitment to GATT, 
and the NAFTA goes into effect. The second scenario assumes that all 
GATT commitments, NAFTA, and the G-3 go into effect. Finally, the third 
scenario includes the fulfillment of both NAFTA and GATT commitments 
and the hypothetical complete elimination of tariffs within the G-3. The 
base period data for the simulation is the average for the years 1991 to 1993. 
Examination of trade data for this period shows that there are trade flows 
between the five regions considered in the simulation model for all 
products to be analyzed. 
-
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3. Simulation Results 
Results for Trade in Pepper 
The situation of this product in terms of tariff schedules is the following. 
Pre-G-3, pre-GAlT, and pre-NAFTA ad-valorem tariffs in Colombia were at 
the 15 percent level vis-a-vis Mexico, the U.S. and ROW, and zero for 
Venezuela. Mexico's were at the 18.4 percent level for all of the other four 
regions. Venezuela's were at the same level as Colombia's (those for 
Colombia being zero). The U.S. does not impose tariffs on peppers. In the 
case of ROW a 14 percent tariff level was used, corresponding to the average 
tariff level for agricultural products in Latin American countries according 
to the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium - IATRC 
(1994). 
Under scenario 1 (no G-3), tariffs are supposed to diminish by 15 percent (for 
instance, to 12.75 percent in the case of Colombia) according to GATT's 
provisions,6 while Mexican tariffs vis-a-vis the U.S. should disappear, as 
agreed in NAFTA. Since peppers are fully included in the G-3's tariff 
elimination schedule, the G-3 and the total liberalization scenarios are the 
same in this case. Therefore complete tariff elimination is considered to 
occur between Mexico and Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela, while 
GATT's and NAFTA's provisions must also be fulfilled. A severe 
limitation of the simulation results for this product is that no information 
-

6 GAlT's Uruguay Round accord on tariffs for agricultural products 
determined an overall (not weighted average) tariff reduction of 36 percent 
and a minimum tariff reduction of 15 percent for each individual product 
(USDA, 1994). 
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was available on production and consumption for Colombia and 
Venezuela. As both countries are concurrently importing and exporting this 
group of products and re-exports are unlikely, it was assumed that 
production equals exports and consumption equals imports. The 
assumption has no basis in fact, but was necessary for the purpose of 
estimating changes in trade flows. Since traded quantities are small, this 
assumption does not have a large impact on the results. Annual average 
Colombian imports for the period 1989 -1993 were 353 tons, while average 
exports were 909 tons. In the case of Venezuela these figures were 289 and 
183 tons for imports and exports respectively. Colombian intra-G-3 trade of 
pepper averaged 25 tons for the base period, while Venezuela did not 
register intra-G-3 trade of this product. Expected percentage changes in 
quantities produced, consumed, and traded, as well as in prices, are reported 
in Table 3 for the two relevant scenarios. 
The results for the No-G-3 scenario are consistent with the behavior that 
might be expected as a response to the tariff modifications. Small variations 
in quantities and prices appear in Colombia and Venezuela, consistent with 
the low reductions in their tariffs and those of their trade partners. 
Similarly, negligible changes are calculated for ROW not only because tariff 
reductions are low in this case but also because of the large size of this 
region as compared to the others (ROW represents 97.6 and 94 percent of 
world production and consumption of pepper respectively). 
.. 
-
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Table 3	 Percentage Changes in Production, Consumption, and Prices for 
Trade in Pepper 
No-G-3 Scenario
 
Percentage change in: COL MEX VEN US ROW
 
Production	 0 -1.5 1.8 3.5 0 
Colombian	 product consumption 0 
Mexican product consumption 2.5 -2.0 2.2 
Venezuelan product consumption	 1.8 
U.S.' product consumption	 45.4 -7.6 -0.8 
ROW's product consumption 0.8 3.3 0.9 0.3 0 
Total consumption	 1.0 0.9 0.9 0 0 
Producer price	 0 -0.8 2.2 4.3 0 
Colombian product price	 0.1 
Mexican product price	 -2.4 -0.5 -0.6 
Venezuelan product price	 -0.5 
U.S.' product price	 -12.8 2.8 0.3 
ROW's product price	 -1.9 -2.3 -1.9 0 0 
G-3 Scenario
 
Percentage change in: COL MEX VEN US ROW
 
Production	 0 -1.5 1.8 3.5 0 
Colombian	 product consumption 0 
Mexican product consumption 43.7 -2.0 2.2 
Venezuelan product consumption	 1.8 
U.S.' product consumption	 45.5 -7.6 -0.8 
ROW's product consumption -1.3 3.4 0.9 0 0 
Total consumption	 1.9 0.9 0.9 0 0 
Producer price	 0 -0.8 2,3 4.4 0 
Colombian product price	 0.1 
Mexican product price	 -13.5 -0.5 -0.6 
Venezuelan product price	 -0.6 
U.S.' product price	 -12.8 2.8 0.3 
ROW's product price	 -1.9 -2.3 -1.9 0 0 
A value of 0 stands for changes lower than 0.1 % while a "_" sign means that 
no production, consumption, or trade flows actually exist. 
Source: simulation results 
-
p-" ~. 
On the other hand, as a result of the NAFTA, sizable changes result for 
Mexico and the U.S. regarding their bilateral trade. U.S. exports to Mexico 
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increase by 45 percent as a response to a consumer price reduction of almost 
13 percent, while domestic consumption of U.S. product decreases by more 
than 7 percent as a result of a consumer price increase near 3 percent. The 
increase in U.S. exports of pepper to Mexico, from 1,676 to 2,437 tons, is due 
to tariff elimination in Mexico. The own price Armington elasticity for this 
product in the Mexican market is -2.88, and its cross price elasticities range 
from 0.49 to 2.057. Mexican exports to the U.S. grow slightly more than 2 
percent due to a moderate reduction in prices (less than one percent). 
Consumption of local product in Mexico diminishes in spite of the fact that 
consumer prices decrease, largely as a consequence of substitutive effects 
with the U.S. product. The asymmetry of these changes is consistent with 
the movement in tariff levels. All variables register changes in the expected 
directions. 
In general, the results for the G-3 scenario are the same. The obvious 
modification is that Mexican exports to Colombia increase by 43.7 percent 
with respect to the base period while in the previous scenario the rate of 
growth was just 2.5 percent. This increase moves Mexican exports up to 
almost 40 tons. The own price Armington elasticity of demand for this 
product in the Colombian market is -2.81 and its cross price elasticity vis-a­
vis ROW's product is 2.38. Correspondingly, consumer prices for Mexican 
products in the Colombian market decrease by more than 13 percent. 
-

7 Relatively large values are typical of Armington elasticities. In this case 
they are driven by an assumed value of 3 for the inter-commodity elasiticity 
of substitution. This topic is discussed in Appendix 3. 
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A substitution effect through which consumption of products originating in 
ROW is replaced by Mexican products takes place. With the G-3 in 
operation, exports from ROW to Colombia are not only unable to increase 
(as in the previous scenario) but also tend to diminish. Total consumption 
in Colombia grows by an additional 1 percent as a result of liberalization 
with Mexico. On the other hand, tariff elimination between Mexico and 
Venezuela may prove useless if the historic lack of trade flows was not due 
to the preexisting tariffs. It is also worth mentioning that even though there 
is a significant increase in Mexican exports to Colombia, due to the 
relatively small size of this trade, there are no effects on the outcome for the 
rest of the regions with respect to the former scenario. 
The relatively large changes in trade flows encountered for the two 
scenarios are due to the small size of trade flows. This can be seen in the 
market shares data reported in Table 4. As is evident, tariff modifications do 
not produce large variations in market shares. In the first scenario, 
however, it is noticeable that the 45 percent increase in U.S. exports to 
Mexico becomes a 44 percent increase in market share for this product. As a 
consequence, domestic production loses market share at the expense of U.S. 
and ROW's products, while slightly increasing its participation in the 
Colombian and U.S. markets. This outcome shows that even though the 
initial level of tariffs in Mexico was not high, important changes accrue 
from complete bilateral trade liberalization. For the second scenario, the 
most important change is that Mexican exports increase their share of the 
­
. 
Colombian market by 3 percent while that of ROW exports diminishes by 
,.~. 
almost the same amount. 
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Table 4 Market Shares for Pepper Before and After Tariff Modifications 
Market Share of: COL MEX VEN US ROW 
Colombian product: before n.a. 1.7
 
Non-G-3 Scenario n.a. 1.7
 
G-3 Scenario n.a. 1.7
 
Mexican product: before 7.2 77.4 5.4
 
Non-G-3 Scenario 7.3 75.1 5.6
 
G-3 Scenario 10.2 75.1 5.6
 
Venezuelan product: before n.a. a
 
Non-G-3 Scenario n.a. a
 
G-3 Scenario n.a. a
 
U.S.' product: before 4.1 6.5 0.1
 
Non-G-3 Scenario 5.9 6.0 0.1
 
G-3 Scenario 5.9 6.0 0.1
 
ROW's product: before 92.7 18.4 100 86.2 99.8
 
Non-G-3 Scenario 92.6 18.9 100 86.6 99.8
 
G-3 Scenario 89.8 18.9 100 86.6 99.8
 
A value of a stands for shares lower than 0.1 % while a "_" sign means that 
no trade flows actually exist. 
Source: simulation results 
Results for Trade in Cotton 
Tariff schedules for this product in the base period follow the pattern 
described below. Colombia and Venezuela impose a 15 percent ad-valorem 
tariff on all of their trading partners and levy no tariffs on bilateral trade 
among themselves. Mexico makes use of a 10 percent ad-valorem tariff vis­
a-vis any exporting country. The U.S. allows tariff-free imports from 
-Colombia and Venezuela because of the Andean Trade Preference Act 
, -, 
(ATPA) and imposes a 4.4 cents per kilogram tariff on any other exporter. 
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IATRC's estimate of the average tariff for agricultural products in Latin 
America is assumed for ROW. 
The first scenario considers the implementation of GATT's Uruguay Round 
agreement on tariffs for agricultural products as well as that of NAFfA. 
Therefore, tariffs are reduced by 15 percent in all regions and completely 
eliminated between Mexico and the U.S. The status of cotton within the G-3 
establishes that the product is excluded from trade liberalization measures 
in the case of Mexico and benefits from a 12 percent reduction in tariffs 
applied by Colombia and Venezuela on Mexico. As a consequence, GATT 
commitments overcome G-3's dispositions for this product, making the 
latter irrelevant. This situation is modeled as the GATT/NAFTA scenario. 
The third scenario assumes complete tariff elimination for trade between 
Mexico and Colombia, and Mexico and Venezuela. 
Table 5 shows that tariff reductions produce negligible effects on production 
and consumption for four out of the five regions included in the model. 
Significant results are found only in the case of Mexico which is completely 
eliminating tariffs vis-a-vis the U.S. and for which imports from the latter 
are important in consumption (as market share data in Table 6 illustrate). 
The increase in imports from the U.S. substitutes for considerable amounts 
of Colombian exports and consumption of domestic products and allows for 
a significant increase in total consumption of cotton in Mexico. The own 
price Armington elasticity of demand for U.S. cotton in Mexico is -1.33 and 
-

the corresponding cross price elasticities vis-a-vis Mexican and Colombian 
cotton are 0.73 and 0.005, respectively. On the other hand, the change in 
Mexican exports to the U.S. market (although less significant in terms of its 
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effect on aggregate consumption) responds to a near 7 percent price 
reduction as a consequence of tariff elimination. The own price Armington 
elasticity in this case is -2.98 and cross price elasticities range from 0.004 to 
2.78. 
Even though not relevant from the point of view of their impact on 
production and total consumption, tariff changes occasioned considerable 
movements in trade flows. Leaving aside substitution effects among 
alternative foreign suppliers, in general it appears that consumption of 
domestic products tends to be replaced by imports. However, data in Table 6 
show that market shares suffer only marginal modifications as tariff 
changes occur. As mentioned, G-3's provisions are irrelevant in this case 
because they are superseded by GATI's. 
If complete tariff elimination occurs for G-3 trade flows, no changes will 
take place in production, consumption, trade flows, prices, and market 
shares for all the regions with the only exception that Colombian exports to 
Mexico would increase by nearly 13 percent instead of decreasing (as in 
scenario 1). This increase allows Colombian exports to maintain their 
participation within the Mexican market as can be seen in Table 6. In this 
case, again, the modest size of trade between Colombia and Mexico prevents 
any further effect on the rest of trade flows and market shares. The 
Armington own price elasticity for Colombian cotton in the Mexican 
market is -2.99. 
­
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Table 5	 Percentage Changes in Production, Consumption, and Prices for 
Cotton 
GAITINAFTA Scenario 
Percentage change in:	 COL MEX VEN US ROW 
Production	 0.1 -1.6 -0.1 0.8 -0.1 
Colombian	 product consumption -0.6 -11.7 -1.1 4.2 
Mexican product consumption	 -10.3 27.6 9.9 
Venezuelan product consumption	 -0.4 5.2 
U.S.' product consumption 3.1 11.3 4.9 -0.3 1.8 
ROW's product consumption 6.4 4.9 4.7 -0.1 
Total consumption	 0 4.7 0.1 -0.1 0 
Producer price	 0.2 -2.7 -0.3 1.1 -0.3 
Colombian product price	 0.1 -1.3 0 -1.6 
Mexican product price	 -1.8 -6.9 -3.3 
Venezuelan product price	 -0.2 -1.9 
U.S.' product price	 -1.1 -8.6 -1.9 1.0 -0.8 
ROW's product price	 -2.1 -1.9 -0.5 -0.2 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination
 
Percentage change in: COL MEX VEN US ROW
 
Production	 0.1 -1.6 -0.1 0.8 -0.1 
Colombian product consumption -0.6 12.6 -1.1 4.1 
Mexican product consumption	 -10.3 27.6 9.9 
Venezuelan product consumption	 -0.4 5.2 
U.S.' product consumption	 3.2 11.3 4.9 -0.3 1.8 
ROW's product consumption 6.5 4.9 4.7 -0.1 
Total consumption	 0 4.7 0.1 -0.1 0 
Producer price	 0.2 -2.8 -0.3 1.1 -0.3 
Colombian	 product price 0.1 -9.0 0 -1.5 
Mexican product price	 -1.8 -6.9 -3.3 
Venezuelan product price	 -0.2 -1.9 
U.S.' product price	 -1.1 -8.6 -1.9 1.0 -0.8 
ROW's product price	 -2.1 -1.9 -0.5 -0.2 
A value of 0 stands for changes lower than 0.1 % while a "_" sign means that 
no production, consumption, or trade flows actually exist. 
Source: simulation results 
-
.. 
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Table 6 Market Shares for Cotton Before and After Tariff Modifications 
Market Share of: COL MEX VEN US ROW 
Colombian product: before 85.8 0.2 13.9 0.1
 
GATTINAFTA Scenario 85.3 0.1 13.7 0.1
 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination 85.2 0.2 13.7 0.1
 
Mexican product: before 30.5 0.5 0
 
GATTINAFTA Scenario 26.1 0.6 0.1
 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination 26.1 0.6 0.1
 
Venezuelan product: before 71.7 0
 
GATT/NAFTA Scenario 71.3 0
 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination 71.3 0
 
U.S.' product: before 9.4 69.2 2.7 99.3 7.7
 
GAITINAFTA Scenario 9.7 73.6 2.8 99.1 7.8
 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination 9.7 73.6 2.8 99.1 7.8
 
ROW's product: before 4.6 11.5 0.1 92.0
 
GAIT/NAFTA Scenario 4.9 12.0 0.1 91.8
 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination 4.9 12.0 0.1 91.8
 
A value of 0 stands for shares lower than 0.1 % while a "_" sign means that 
no trade flows actually exist. 
Source: simulation results 
Results for Trade in Dry Leguminous Vegetables 
The subgroup includes dry beans, peas, chickpeas, and lentils. In the cases in 
which tariffs vary from one product to another, the starting tariff level for 
the group was determined as the non-weighted average tariff for the group. 
Tariff levels in Colombia and Venezuela are at the 15 percent level ad­
valorem for all traders and zero for bilateral trade between the two 
countries. Mexican tariffs are fixed at the 10 percent level for imports from ­
, . 
all origins. U.S. tariffs are zero for Colombia and Venezuela according to 
ATPA regulations and stand at 3 cents per kilogram for the rest of foreign 
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supplies. The same average tariff employed before (14 percent) was assumed 
for ROW. 
GATT's and NAFTA's tariff reductions form the first scenario to be 
simulated. It coincides with scenario 2 since this group of products was 
excluded from the G-3's tariff elimination schedule. Therefore, in this 
scenario, identified as the GAIT/NAFTA scenario, tariffs are reduced by 15 
percent in all countries and for all origins, and complete tariff elimination 
occurs between Mexico and the U.S. As usual, the third scenario assumes 
complete tariff elimination applying to trade flows within G-3 member 
countries. 
Data in Table 7 indicate that there are no changes of empirical importance in 
production or consumption levels as a result of the GATT/NAFTA 
scenario; hence, what happens as a result is mostly that trade flows suffer 
some adjustment following tariff changes and 'comparative advantage'. As 
a consequence of tariff elimination, significant trade flow increases occur for 
both Mexican exports to the U.S. and U.S. exports to Mexico. Substitutive 
effects between consumption of domestic production and Mexican or U.S. 
exports in each case are the source of such growth. Armington own price 
elasticity of demand for U.s. product in the Mexican market is -2.94 while its 
cross price elasticities with respect to Mexican and ROW's products are 2.53 
and 0.018. Conversely, own price elasticity for the Mexican product in the 
U.s. market is -2.95 and its cross price elasticities vis-a-vis U.S. and ROW's 
-
products are 2.34 and 0.21. , 
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Table 7	 Percentage Changes in Production, Consumption, and Prices for 
Dried Leguminous Vegetables 
GAITINAFfA Scenario
 
Percentage change in: COL MEX VEN US ROW
 
Production	 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 0.9 0 
Colombian	 product consumption -0.1 -0.6 6.8 
Mexican product consumption	 -0.4 2.5 15.8 5.7 
Venezuelan product consumption 0.4 -0.9 23.5 
U.S.' product consumption -2.4 29.0 -0.9 -1.0 2.6 
ROW's product consumption 2.3 3.4 2.0 4.4 0 
Total consumption	 0.5 0.1 0.6 -0.2 0 
Producer price	 -1.8 -0.1 -1.5 1.1 0 
Colombian product price	 -1.1 -1.0 -2.1 
Mexican product price	 -0.1 -2.1 -4.1 -1.8 
Venezuelan product price	 -1.3 -0.9 -6.8 
U.S.' product price	 -0.3 -8.3 -0.9 1.0 -0.8 
ROW's product price	 -1.9 -1.3 -1.9 -0.7 0 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination
 
Percentage change in: COL MEX VEN US ROW
 
Production	 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 0.9 0 
Colombian	 product consumption -0.1 -0.7 6.8 
Mexican product consumption	 -0.4 46.7 15.7 5.6 
Venezuelan product consumption 0.5 -1.0 24.1 
U.S.' product consumption -2.4 29.0 -1.0 -1.0 2.6 
ROW's product consumption 2.3 3.4 1.9 4.4 0 
Total consumption	 0.5 0.1 0.6 -0.2 0 
Producer price	 -1.8 -0.1 -1.6 1.1 0 
Colombian product price	 -1.1 -1.0 -2.1 
Mexican product price	 -0.1 -13.1 -4.1 -1.8 
Venezuelan product price	 -1.3 -0.9 -6.9 
U.S.' product price	 -0.3 -8.3 -0.9 1.0 -0.8 
ROW's product price	 -1.9 -1.3 -1.9 -0.7 0 
A value of 0 stands for changes lower than 0.1 % while a "-" sign means that 
no production, consumption, or trade flows actually exist. 
Source: simulation results 
-

With the exception of ROW, due to the large size of its market as compared 
to the other regions, consumption of domestic product diminishes in all 
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cases because of relatively larger decreases in competing products' prices. 
This situation allows competing suppliers to have a bigger 'market space' to 
adjust their participation. In this way, increases in ROW's product 
participation in the other four markets as well as the increase of Mexican 
exports to Venezuela should be regarded as stemming from their 
'comparative advantage' (as expressed in larger price declines). 
The scenario in which complete tariff elimination among G-3 partners is 
assumed basically leads to modifications in growth rates for Mexican exports 
to Venezuela and to a lesser extent Venezuelan exports to ROW. Tariff 
elimination makes Mexican exports to Venezuela increase more than 46 
percent (from 410 to 601 tons.). However, price reductions are unable to 
produce a further expansion of total consumption (with respect to that in 
scenario 1) and consequently Mexican gains in market share (presented in 
Table 8) are obtained at the expense of Colombian and U.S. export 
reductions as well as a decrease in consumption of domestic products. The 
Armington own price elasticity of demand for Mexican products in the 
Venezuelan market is -2.99 while its corresponding cross price elasticities 
with respect to Colombian, Venezuelan, U.S, and ROW's products are 0.15, 
0.84, 0.27, and 1.3. A very slight price decrease for Venezuelan products 
oriented to ROW's market moderately improves their rate of growth over 
that obtained in the former scenario. This change stems from the 
adjustment of producer prices for Venezuelan products in the process of 
reaching a new equilibrium level but due to its marginal nature it is not 
-

reflected in data on the Venezuelan market. 
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Table 8	 Market Shares for Dried Leguminous Vegetables Before and 
After Tariff Modifications 
Market Share of:	 COL MEX VEN US ROW 
Colombian product: before 63.7 5.9 0
 
GATTINAFTA Scenario 63.3 5.9 0
 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination 63.3 5.9 0
 
Mexican product: before 97.3 0.2 1.6 0
 
GATTINAFTA Scenario 96.7 0.3 1.9 0
 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination 96.7 0.4 1.9 0
 
Venezuelan product: before 0.5 32.6 0
 
GATTINAFTA Scenario 0.5 32.1 0
 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination 0.5 32.1 0
 
U.S.' product: before 3.6 1.9 10.7 90.0 0.8
 
GATTINAFTA Scenario 3.5 2.5 10.5 89.3 0.8
 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination 3.5 2.5 10.5 89.3 0.8
 
ROW's product: before 32.0 0.7 50.3 8.2 99.1
 
GATTINAFTA Scenario 32.5 0.7 51.0 8.6 99.1
 
G-3 Total Tariff Elimination 32.5 0.7 50.9 8.6 99.1
 
A value of 0 stands for shares lower than 0.1 % while a "_" sign means that 
no trade flows actually exist. 
Source: simulation results 
The lack of importance of trade flow changes reported in Table 7 in the 
context of this product's trade structure is reflected in the great stability of 
market share data presented in Table 8. Only in the case of complete tariff 
elimination (NAFTA countries), are relatively important modifications in 
market shares registered. As in the cases of other products, this outcome 
depends not only on the modest level of tariff reductions but also on the 
non-discriminatory basis of the GATT's commitment that reduces tariffs for 
-

all countries in the same proportion and therefore tends to maintain the 
existing price structure. As tariff reductions are small, consumer prices for 
imports are precluded from fully reflecting the differences in 'comparative 
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advantage' among suppliers and the trade structure tends to be more stable 
than in the case of complete liberalization. There is practically no 
modification in market share data when going from the first to the second 
scenario. The only difference in market share changes between the two 
scenarios is a 0.1 percent increase in market share for Mexican products in 
the Venezuelan market occurring at the expense of ROW's exports. 
Results for Trade in Sesame Seed 
Of the four products included in this analysis, sesame seed is the most 
'liberalized' in that neither the U.S. and Mexico impose tariffs on their 
imports from any supplier (on the grounds of the Generalized System of 
Preferences in the first case and the Most Favored Nation principle in the 
second). On the other hand, Colombia and Venezuela apply a 15 percent ad­
valorem tariff on all imports and allow tariff-free imports for their bilateral 
trade. As in the cases of the other products, ROW is assumed to levy a 14 
percent ad-valorem tariff on imports of this good. 
Given that NAFTA's provisions are not relevant in this case, the first 
scenario only depicts the effects of GATT's commitment on trade (GATT 
scenario). Under G-3's regulations, Colombia and Venezuela are expected to 
apply a 12 percent reduction in their tariffs on Mexico. However, G-3's rules 
are redundant in this case since they are more lenient than GATT's and, 
additionally, there are no actual trade flows of this product going from 
-

Mexico to Colombia or Venezuela. Therefore, only the GATT scenario has 
relevance in terms of observing possible changes in trade flows, prices, and 
market shares. 
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Data in Table 9 show that marginal changes occur in production and 
consumption levels as well as in trade flows as a consequence of tariff 
reductions following GAIT's compromises. These changes are largely 
driven by the fact that all countries trade (specifically export to) with ROW. 
Tariff reductions in ROW import regime pull up its imports from the four 
other regions and therefore the new equilibrium prices expressed in terms 
of each supplier's consumer price for domestic product increase. 
Consumers' response to this price increase translates into a diminution of 
domestic product consumption and allows for a limited substitution of 
imports for domestic product whose extent depends upon the differences in 
border prices among competing imports. As a result, bilateral trade (in both 
directions) between Colombia and Venezuela increases; Venezuelan exports 
to Mexico increase, although ROW's export increase is larger; and all exports 
to the U.S., with the exception of ROW's, decrease. 
Market share data reported in Table 10 illustrate the relative importance of 
trade flow changes in affecting this product's trade structure. Given that the 
USDA does not report production of sesame for the U.S., re-exports are 
treated as 'domestic' production without being counted as consumption of 
domestic product. Market composition remains the same or almost the 
same for four out of the five regions while that of Colombia suffers a 
relatively sizable modification due to the lack of diversification in suppliers 
combined with its considerable dependency on imports. 
-
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Table 9	 Percentage Changes in Production, Consumption, and Prices for 
Sesame Seed 
GATT Scenario 
Percentage change in: COL MEX VEN US ROW 
Production 1.0 0.5 1.1 1.0 0 
Colombian product consumption -3.3 4.6 -5.0 4.8 
Mexican product consumption -0.6 -1.2 5.1 
Venezuelan product consumption 3.5 0.6 -0.4 -2.7 5.0 
U.S.' product consumption -8.8 4.1 
ROW's product consumption 1.7 1.0 0 
Total consumption -1.1 -0.1 -0.4 0 0 
Producer price 4.1 1.1 2.8 1.8 0 
Colombian product price 2.5 0 2.0 -1.5 
Mexican product price 0.7 0.7 -1.7 
Venezuelan product price 0.2 0.3 1.7 1.2 -1.6 
U.S.' product price 3.7 8.4 -1.3 
ROW's product price 0 0 0 
A value of 0 stands for changes lower than 0.1 % while a "_" sign means that 
no production, consumption, or trade flows actually exist. 
Source: simulation results 
Table 10	 Market Shares for Sesame Seed Before and After Tariff 
Modifications 
Market Share of:	 COL MEX VEN US ROW 
Colombian product: before 67.2 0.5 0.1 0.1
 
GAIT Scenario 65.6 0.5 0.1 0.1
 
Mexican product: before 56.2 48.8 0.3
 
GAIT Scenario 55.9 48.2 0.3
 
Venezuelan product: before 32.7 17.1 99.4 3.9 0.2
 
GAIT Scenario 34.3 17.2 99.4 3.7 0.2
 
U.S.' product: before 3.2 0 
GAIT Scenario 2.9 0 
ROW's product: before 23.3 50.6 99.1 
GAIT Scenario 23.7 51.2 99.1 
­
A value of 0 stands for shares lower than 0.1 % while a "_" sign means that .'
 
no trade flows actually exist.
 
Source: simulation results
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Welfare Effects 
Changes in 'quantity' variables and prices are indicative of the net effect of 
tariff reductions on producers and consumers, although they do not suffice 
to determine their effect on economic welfare for these agents or for the 
whole economy. Therefore, in order to assess the size and direction of 
economic welfare changes arising from trade liberalization, it is necessary to 
obtain direct estimates of these changes. The results of this exercise for each 
region, type of economic agent, and scenario are reported in this section and 
presented as a percentage of the value of trade for each country in the base 
period. 
Table 11	 Welfare Effects Arising from Tariff Reductions on Trade in 
Pepper (as a percentage of the value of its trade in the base 
period) 
Percentage change in:	 COL MEX VEN US ROW 
Producer surplus: no-G-3 scenario 0 -1.9 0 0.6 0.4 
G-3 scenario 0 -1.9 0 0.6 0.4 
Consumer surplus: no G-3 scenario 0.9 13.3 2.1 -0.5 -0.4 
G-3 scenario 1.6 13.3 2.1 -0.5 -0.4 
Governmt.	 revenue: no G-3 scenario -0.6 -4.0 -2.0 0 -0.2 
G-3 scenario -0.9 -4.0 -2.0 0 -0.2 
Tot. welfare change: no-G-3 scenario 0.3 7.5 0.2 0.1 -0.2 
G-3 scenario 0.7 7.5 0.2 0.1 -0.2 
A value of 0 stands for zero or for changes lower than 0.1 %. 
Source: simulation results 
-

Table 11 presents estimates of the welfare effects corresponding to the two 
scenarios considered in the case of trade in pepper. These results indicate 
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that under both scenarios the only country that has significant changes in 
economic welfare is Mexico. In fact, the value of economic welfare gains in 
this case is equivalent to 7.5 percent of the value of its trade in pepper. 
Under the no-G-3 scenario, Mexican producers lose while U.S.' and ROW's 
producers gain. Consumers gain in Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela and 
lose in the U.S. and ROW8. Obviously, government revenues decline in all 
regions, although losses in the U.S. are lower than 0.1 percent of this 
country's value of trade. Overall welfare effects are positive and negligible 
for Colombia, Venezuela, and the U.S.; positive and relevant for Mexico; 
and small and negative for ROW. 
The G-3 scenario, which implies complete tariff elimination for trade flows 
between Mexico and Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela, affects only the 
outcome previously obtained for Colombia. Consumer surplus rises from 
0.9 percent to 1.6 percent, government revenue further declines 0.3 percent, 
and total welfare improves 0.4 percent. These changes are modest indeed 
and as such do not affect those obtained for Mexico under the first scenario. 
Tariff reductions applied to cotton trade bring welfare gains to all regions for 
the two scenarios. Data in Table 12 indicate that exactly the same outcome is 
reached under the two alternatives. As was the case with trade in pepper, 
Mexico reaps the largest benefits due to the effect of NAFrA. GATT and 
NAFTA regulated tariff reductions yield welfare gains for Colombian and 
U.S.' producers and losses for Mexican, Venezuelan and ROW's. However, 
­
8 It is worthwhile recalling that lack of information on Colombian and 
Venezuelan production and consumption severely limits the reliability of 
these results. 
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welfare changes for Colombian and Venezuelan producers are nil. On the 
other hand, with the exception of the U.S., consumers gain in all markets, 
Mexicans benefiting the most, followed by those of ROW. Government 
revenues decline worldwide (less than 0.1 percent in the U.S.). 
Table 12	 Welfare Effects Arising from Tariff Reductions on Trade in 
Cotton (as a percentage of the value of its trade in the base 
period) 
Percentage change in: COL MEX VEN US ROW 
Producer surplus: G IN scenario 0.3 -1.3 -0.2 2.8 -2.8 
no-tariffs scen 0.4 -1.3 -0.2 2.8 -2.8 
Consumer surplus: GIN scenario 0.4 17.0 2.2 -1.6 6.2 
no-tariffs scen 0.3 17.1 2.2 -1.6 6.2 
Government revenue: GIN scenario -0.5 -7.7 -0.8 0 -1.6 
no-tariffs sce -0.5 -7.7 -0.8 0 -1.6 
Total welfare change: G IN scenario 0.2 8.0 1.3 1.2 1.8 
no-tariffs scen 0.2 8.0 1.3 1.2 1.8 
A value of 0 stands for zero or for changes lower than 0.1 %. 
G IN scenario: GATT INAFTA scenario 
no-tariffs scenario: complete tariff elimination among G-3 partners 
Source: simulation results 
The G-3's tariff reductions for cotton have no practical meaning because 
reductions required by the GATT are greater. In the scenario of a 
hypothetical total tariff elimination among G-3 countries, welfare effects 
would register modifications only for Colombia and Mexico. Colombian 
producer's	 surplus would increase from 0.3 to 0.4 percent while consumer 
surpluses	 would decline for Colombian consumers and increase for 
­
Mexican consumers by 0.1 percent in both cases. As is evident, the impact of 
such a scenario on economic welfare would be small,. 
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Table 13	 Welfare Effects Arising from Tariff Reductions on Trade in 
Dried Leguminous Vegetables (as a percentage of the value of its 
trade in the base period) 
Percentage change in:	 COL MEX VEN US ROW 
Producer surplus: G IN scenario -4.3 -2.3 -0.5 2.2 -0.5 
no-tariffs scen -4.3 -2.1 -0.5 2.2 -0.5 
Consumer surplus: G IN scenario 12.7 11.0 6.4 -1.0 2.1 
no-tariffs scen 12.7 10.8 6.7 -1.0 2.1 
Government revenue: GIN scenario -1.6 -3.0 -1.7 -0.2 -1.1 
no-tariffs sce -1.6 -3.0 -1.8 -0.2 -1.1 
Total welfare change: G IN scenario 6.8 5.7 4.2 1.0 0.5 
no-tariffs scen 6.8 5.7 4.4 1.0 0.5 
A value of 0 stands for zero or for changes lower than 0.1 %. 
GIN scenario: GAIT/NAFTA scenario 
no-tariffs scenario: complete tariff elimination among G-3 partners 
Source: simulation results 
Welfare effects of tariff reductions applied to trade in dried leguminous 
vegetables are presented in Table 13. These estimates indicate that all 
regions derive benefits from tariff reductions and that, unlike the previous 
cases, they are significant for all G-3 member countries. Under the 
GAITINAFTA scenario, U.S. producers benefit from tariff reductions while 
U.S. consumers lose. In contrast, the rest of the regions present producer 
surplus declines and consumer surplus increases. The apparent reason for 
this outcome is that tariff reduction in ROW on U.S. products leads to an 
increase of prices for U.S. exports that affects consumer prices in the U.S 
(substitution effects in consumption being unable to offset its negative effect 
on consumers). U.S. exports to ROW represent 89.3 percent of U.S. exports 
­
of these products in the base period and 36.1 percent of domestic production. 
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Since the rest of the regions face reductions in tariffs (except Mexico), 
substitution effects dominate and consumer gains result. 
A complete tariff elimination among G-3 partners, considered in the second 
scenario, would alter economic welfare results for Mexico and Venezuela. 
As Mexican exports to Venezuela grow as a result of tariff elimination, 
Mexican producers lose less than in the previous scenario, and conversely, 
Mexican consumers gain less. In Venezuela, consumers marginally increase 
their gains, government revenue decreases further, and total welfare is 
slightly enhanced. 
Table 14 presents estimates of changes in economic welfare in the sesame 
seed market stemming from tariff reductions agreed in the framework of 
GATT's Uruguay Round. As can be seen, all regions derive net benefits 
from tariff reductions; however, their significance is meager. Colombia, 
Mexico, Venezuela, and the U.s. present producer surplus gains and 
consumer surplus losses. This situation arises as a consequence of the fact 
that all regions export this product to ROW. Therefore, the increase in their 
export prices as a result of tariff reductions push consumer prices upward 
(tariff reduction makes ROW's imports grew 5 percent while its exports 
grew 1.1 percent). Government revenues remain unchanged because 
neither Mexico nor the U.S. levy tariffs on this product and Colombia and 
Venezuela import only from each other, these imports being tariff-free. 
-

The opposite outcome is observed for ROW. Producer surplus decreases, 
consumer surplus increases, and government revenue decreases. All 
welfare changes in this case are driven by trade flows between ROWand the 
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rest of the regions. This is so because the existing trade flows among the 
latter group are performed under tariff-free conditions either in the 
framework of FfAs or zero tariff levels in the context of the Most Favored 
Nation principle (this situation is reflected in the absence of government 
revenue changes). ROW only exports to Mexico and the U.S., both countries 
being tariff-free for these products Therefore no trade gains arise from tariff 
reductions. 
Table 14	 Welfare Effects Arising from Tariff Reductions on Trade in 
Sesame Seed (as a percentage of the value of its trade in the base 
period) 
Percentage change in: COL MEX VEN US ROW 
Producer surplus: GATT seen. 3.6 0.9 4.3 0.3 -1.1 
Consumer surplus: GATT seen. -2.7 -0.4 -2.7 -0.4 3.1 
Government revenue: GATT seen. 0 0 0 0 -0.5 
Total welfare change: GATT seen. 1.0 0.5 1.7 0 1.5 
A value of 0 stands for zero or for changes lower than 0.1 %. 
Source: simulation results 
4. Implications of the Empirical Analysis 
The simulation of the effects of G-3 provisions on member countries' 
production, consumption, prices, trade flows, and economic welfare related 
to agricultural trade is intended to explore the outcome of this trade 
agreement. The results of this effort are tentative in nature and are affected 
by the limitations that characterize the modeling approach. Nevertheless, 
­
they are consistent with both the theoretical foundation of the analysis of 
discriminatory trade policies (as applied to FfAs) and the empirical data 
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upon which the simulation is constructed. Furthermore, the coherence 
among the outcomes of the different scenarios considered indicates that the 
model behaves properly and yields reasonable results. 
However, in analyzing the cases of three out of the four products that were 
selected, no modeling effort at all is required. G-3's tariff reductions for 
cotton and sesame seed were either overcome by GATT's Uruguay Round 
commitments or rendered pointless due to the actual direction of trade 
flows. The third product, dried leguminous vegetables, was excluded from 
tariff reductions. On the other hand, the fourth product (pepper) was 
scheduled for complete tariff elimination and as a consequence a relatively 
big increase in Colombian imports from Mexico is obtained. A modest 
improvement in Colombian economic welfare arises from this trade flow 
change and no welfare consequences are derived for Mexico. 
This situation implies that G-3's provisions related to agricultural trade are 
likely to be largely irrelevant in bringing economic gains to member 
countries. The significance of estimating the possible outcome of a scenario 
in which tariffs were completely eliminated among G-3 partners is to 
foresee the potential of the agreement to become significant in enhancing 
agricultural trade and improving economic welfare. To assess this 
possibility all that is needed is to analyze the cases of cotton and dried 
leguminous vegetables, since pepper has already been liberalized and tariff 
elimination for sesame seed is meaningless. 
The results of the simulation seem to indicate that there is not much 
potential for the G-3 in agriculture. If tariffs were eliminated for trade in 
-
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cotton, Colombian exports to Mexico would increase and would be able to 
offset their tendency to decline due to the competition of U.S.' cotton 
(stimulated through NAFTA). Furthermore, the net result would be an 
increase of nearly 13 percent in value with respect to that of the base period. 
However, this rate of growth would just keep the participation of 
Colombian exports in the Mexican market at the same level they had in the 
base period. Additionally, no welfare gain increases would be obtained 
either for Colombia or for Mexico over those of the GATT INAFTA 
scenario. 
In the case of complete liberalization of trade for dried leguminous 
vegetables, Mexican exports to Venezuela would grow almost 47 percent 
(but only 2.5 percent in the GATT/NAFTA scenario). In this way, Mexican 
products' market share in Venezuela would reach 0.4 percent, or twice their 
share in the base period. Consistent with the marginal magnitude of this 
change, no substantial modifications in economic welfare would occur from 
the results of the alternative scenario. 
Therefore, the 'end result' of this analysis is that in the cases of these four 
products and presumably for member countries' agricultural sector in 
general, the G-3 lacks great economic importance. Furthermore, even if it 
were used to completely liberalize agricultural trade between member 
countries, the outcome would not be different in terms of improving their 
economic welfare. However, sizable increases in trade flows (in relative 
-

terms) would be obtained in three cases. The low volume of trade between 
Mexico and Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela, combined with relatively 
low tariff levels in the pre-G-3 period (reached in the process of unilateral 
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trade liberalization in each country}, seem to determine this outcome. 
Besides these factors, the impact of NAFTA and GATT's Uruguay Round 
accord tend to diminish potential gains from the G-3. N AFTA affects the 
outcome of the G-3 because it creates other discriminatory trade relations 
that affect the behavior of Mexican agricultural trade with Mexico's most 
important trade partner (NAFTA being more powerful than the G-3 in its 
tariff effects). GATT's Uruguay Round affects the G-3 because the non­
discriminatory nature of its tariff reduction lessen the effect of G-3's tariff 
discrimination. 
5. Conclusions 
The broadest conclusion of the research is that in its current status the G-3 
performs poorly in liberalizing agricultural trade among G-3 partners. The 
reason for this is simple: the G-3 lacks wide coverage of agricultural 
products. Extensive lists of excluded products were established for each 
country on the grounds of their 'sensitivity' and others were subject to 
special provisions that restrict free trade (as in the case of sugar). Since the 
lists of exclusions are comprehensive, the agreement practically precludes 
the possibility of new products entering bilateral trade as a consequence of 
its implementation (tariffs, surcharges, and other trade restrictions normally 
applied to these products are maintained at their original levels). 
The second general conclusion obtained is that even in the cases in which 
-
the agreement effectively liberalizes trade its results appear to be small. The 
empirical results indicate that the impact of the G-3 is marginal when 
considered in terms of each good's domestic production, total consumption, 
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or welfare effects. This is so because of the small absolute and relative level 
of trade between G-3 partners9 and the relatively low level of tariffs applied 
in each country in the pre-agreement period. Therefore, it is expected that 
products currently scheduled for tariff elimination within the G-3 other 
than the ones included in the simulation analysis should show similar 
results. This is the case of the groups of products identified as the most 
important in intra-G-3 agricultural trade for which tariff elimination has 
been agreed, namely vegetable materials for perfumery and pharmacy and 
vegetable materials for different uses. This conclusion is consistent with 
Customs Union theory which states that a Free Trade Agreement is more 
likely to be trade creating when pre-agreement bilateral trade and tariff 
levels are relatively large. 
The third conclusion is that the potential of the G-3 agreement to yield 
significant benefits to member countries in the case in which total tariff 
elimination is accomplished is limited. Simulation results under the 
scenario of total tariff elimination among G-3 partners show the same 
situation that was described in the previous paragraph. Low trade levels are 
pervasive in intra-G-3 agricultural trade and are responsible for this 
outcome. In this case, however, some qualifications are in order. First, 
relatively more important effects may arise if trade in groups of products 
currently excluded and recording high shares in historical bilateral flows 
were to be liberalized. Examples of this situation are trade in edible products 
and preparations and sugar and honey. However, products such as cotton 
-

9 It is worthwhile recalling that G-3's agricultural provisions rule trade 
between Mexico and Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela, while trade 
between Colombia and Venezuela is ruled according to the Andean Pact. 
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and fresh and simply preserved vegetables, which were included in the 
empirical analysis and also show relatively high shares in historical bilateral 
trade flows, support the idea that rather limited effects would arise from 
complete G-3 trade liberalization for agricultural products. The second 
qualification is that, under a complete liberalization scenario, intra-G-3 
agricultural trade may diversify and include a number of products that 
regardless of their individual importance could account for sizable aggregate 
effects. This remains as an open question for the purposes of this study. 
The fourth general conclusion is that the G-3 tends to be neutral in terms of 
its trade creating or trade diverting effects. When it is relevant <e.g. when it 
provides for complete tariff elimination in the market for pepper), the G-3 
tends to be marginally trade creating in its effects on Colombia. However, 
simulation of complete tariff elimination for the rest of the selected 
products indicates that no welfare changes would be obtained with respect to 
the scenario that assumes only NAFTA's and GATT's tariff reductions. 
Thus, the whole effect of the agreement on each product's market may be 
best described as neutral either in the current status of the agreement or 
under the hypothesis of complete tariff elimination for all agricultural 
products. However, the same qualifications made in relation to the 
previous conclusion apply in this case. In this respect, the results of the 
research again seem to be consistent with Customs Union theory. As pre­
agreement trade flows and tariff levels between partner countries are 
relatively low, the outcome of the agreement is less likely to be trade 
­
creating. On the other hand, as tariff levels vis-a-vis third countries are not 
very different from those between partner countries (as a consequence of 
initial low levels and the commitment to reduce them on a non­
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discriminatory basis) the agreement is less likely to be trade diverting. 
Seemingly, it may be the situation that in this case the two tendencies 
counteract, producing a neutral effect. 
Some other conclusions are also in order. The most relevant may be that 
the G-3 appears to be able to produce a significant impact on intra-G-3 
agricultural trade flows if the member countries extend it to provide for 
complete tariff elimination. With the exception of trade in sesame seed (for 
which G-3 provisions, regardless of the level of tariff reductions, are 
irrelevant due to the actual direction of trade flows), tariff elimination 
produces increases in the relevant trade flows in the range of 24 to 40 
percent. Under these conditions, the agreement would fulfill one of its 
stated objectives: that of boosting trade among partner countries. 
Furthermore, in the absence of complete tariff elimination within the G-3, 
bilateral trade between member countries may be reduced as a consequence 
of changes in tariff levels among individual member countries and third 
countries. An example of this situation is trade of cotton between Colombia 
and Mexico; under the current conditions (28 percent tariff reduction for 
Mexican imports from Colombia and complete tariff elimination for 
Mexican imports from the U.S.), Colombian exports to Mexico would 
decline by nearly 12 percent while if total tariff elimination is carried out 
through the G-3 they would increase more than 12 percent. 
Nevertheless, simulation results also show that these increases in trade 
flows produce only slight changes in market shares. This finding contrasts 
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sharply with some expectations about the impact of the G-310. This situation 
brings up two considerations. First, benefits accruing from trade agreements 
may have been overstated in the 'official' literature, perhaps as a result of 
lack of empirical validation. Second, the relevance of trade flows with third 
countries as well as of other trade agreements (bilateral or multilateral) 
must not be underestimated. 
The empirical analysis shows that the G-3's agricultural provisions are 
limited for enhancing member countries' trade and improving their 
economic welfare but indicated that trade flows may be substantially affected 
by the agreement in the cases in which complete tariff elimination is 
achieved. However, even under complete tariff elimination for agricultural 
products within the G-3, it is likely that its impact on variables other than 
trade flows would be negligible. Since further 'modernization' and 
improvement of agricultural sector competitiveness is frequently sought by 
means of trade liberalization, the contribution of the empirical research may 
be significant for showing its limitations about attaining this objective. The 
point is that it may be the case that the current structure of trade makes 
trade liberalization a poor instrument for promoting improvements in the 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector of G-3 partner countries. 
Therefore, if enhancing competitiveness is a high priority objective of 
agricultural policy, alternative instruments should be employed. 
-

10 Officials of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Trade, for instance, 
estimated that Colombian agricultural exports to Mexico could increase 
their market share up to 80 percent as a consequence of the G-3. 
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Although limited, the results of the empirical analysis of the impact of the 
G-3's agricultural provisions on member countries agricultural trade are 
robust and provide a reliable vision of the likely outcome of the agreement 
in this area. Nonetheless, it is worth recalling that these conclusions refer 
exclusively to the agricultural sector and do not imply any extension to 
other areas of action of the agreement. 
-

,­
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Appendix 1
 
Data Sources
 
Production data come from different sources. The main source is the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAa), either from the 
AGROSTAT database or from the "Production Yearbook 1994". 
Complementary information come from the Colombian Ministry of 
Agriculture's "Agriculture and Livestock Sectors Statistical Yearbook" (1990 
and 1994), the Venezuelan Ministry of Agriculture's "Agricultural Statistical 
Yearbook 1989/91" (1994), and the USDA-NASS' "Agricultural Statistics 
1994". No information on pepper production was available for Colombia 
and Venezuela; hence, production was assumed to be equal to exports for 
these countries. In all cases consumption was treated as disappearance. 
Therefore it was calculated as the difference between production plus 
imports and exports. Consumption of pepper in Colombia and Venezuela 
was assumed as equivalent to the volume of imports. The Rest of the 
World (ROW) was assumed as a production and trade balancing region. 
Trade data, quantities and values, come from the United Nations Statistical 
Office's "Commodity Trade Statistics; according to the Standard 
International Trade Classification". Data are disaggregated at the four digits 
level of the SITe. Imports are reported at their CIF price level while exports 
at their FOB price level. Data for the period 1989 - 1993 were used to describe 
the structure of agricultural trade between G-3 partners. Average trade data 
-

for the period 1991 - 1993 was employed as base data for the simulation 
model. To conciliate differences in data reported by the trading countries, it 
was decided to average the corresponding reports. 
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Unit values, calculated from trade data, were used instead of prices. Each 
product's consumer price in a particular market was calculated as the 
corresponding imports' unit value plus tariff charges. Producer prices were 
estimated on the basis of average price differentials between consumer and 
producer levels adjusted according to producer, wholesale, and consumer 
price indexes for each country. Price differentials come from different 
publications such as USDA's serial "Situation and Outlook Report", 
Colombian Ministry of Agriculture's "Agriculture and Livestock Sectors 
Statistical Yearbook", and Venezuelan Ministry of Agriculture's 
"Agricultural Statistical Yearbook". Price indexes information come from 
International Monetary Fund's "International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
1995". Trade costs were calculated as the difference between FOB and CIF 
unit values for each product. 
Price elasticities of supply and demand as well as price transmission 
elasticities come form USDA's "A 1989 Global Database for the Static World 
Policy Simulation (SWOPSIM) Modeling Framework", Liapis et al (1992) 
"Modeling Preferential Trading Arrangements for the Agricultural Sector. 
A U.S-Mexico Example", and Colombian Ministry of Agriculture's "Final 
Report of the Commission for the Study of the Agricultural Sector". 
Parameter estimates for dried leguminous vegetables were assimilated to 
the corresponding to dry beans in Liapis et al for Mexico, the U.S., and 
ROW; in the cases of Colombia and Venezuela the values of ROW were 
­
employed as a proxy and the supply elasticity for Colombia come from the 
Colombian Ministry of Agriculture's study. The. same procedure was 
followed to identify parameter estimates for pepper. In this case Liapis' 
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estimates for peppers were used, including those for Colombia. Price 
transmission elasticities were assumed unity; the assumption is based on 
appreciation of estimates from other studies such as Bolling (1988), Tyers 
and Anderson (1988), and the SWOPSIM's database (1992). Estimates for 
sesame seed and cotton for the whole set of regions come from the 
SWOPSIM's database with the only exception of Colombian elasticities of 
supply that are based on the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture's study. The 
group 'oil seeds' was used as a proxy for sesame seed and direct estimates 
were available for cotton. Parameter estimates for the SWOPSIM group 
"other Latin America", defined within the world model data set of this 
database, were employed to represent those of ROW. The Armington's 
elasticity of substitution between 'products' of the same kind was assumed 
to be -3 as it has been the case since early applications of the procedure ­
Grennes et al. (1977); Liapis et al. (1992); even though Dixit and Roningen 
(1986) do not use this value, they employ values around it). 
Tariffs data come from the Colombian Manufacturers Association's G-3 
database, the U.S. International Trade Commission's "Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the U.S.", and the International Agricultural Trade Research 
Consortium's study "The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: An 
Evaluation". Data on tariff changes come from the G-3 Agreement, the 
NAFTA agreement, and the IATRC's study. 
-
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Appendix 2
 
Base Data
 
Table A-2.1 Quantities, Prices, and Elasticities for the Simulation Model 
for Pepper <average 1991-1993) 
Colombia Mexico Venezuela U.S. ROW 
Production 1 
Consumption 1 
Total Exports 1 
Total Imports 1 
Producers Price 2 
Consums. Price 2 
Price Trans. Elas.'" 
Supply Elasticity 
Demand Elasticity 
1,353 
344 
1,353 
344 
623 
997 
1 
0.81 
-0.5 
35,500 
40,400 
4,231 
9,131 
1,307 
1,984 
1 
1.79 
-0.4 
103 
331 
103 
331 
201 
335.5 
1 
0.81 
-0.5 
10,000 
76,782 
4,991 
71,773 
1,803 
2,800 
1 
0.81 
-0.5 
1,886,544 
1,815,643 
74,319 
3,418 
1,002.3 
1,495.9 
1 
0.81 
-0.5 
1 Tons. 
2 U.S. dollars 
.. Price Transmission Elasticity 
-
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Table A-2.2	 Trade Data for the Simulation Model for Pepper <average 
1991-1993) 
Colombian Mexico Venezuela U.S. ROW 
Imports Quantities 
Values 
50 
92,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
294 
398,000 
Exports Quantities 
Values 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1,353 
1,349,000 
0 
0 
Mexican Colombia Venezuela U.S. ROW 
Imports Quantities 
Values 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1,453 
2,908,000 
7,678 
9,515,000 
Exports Quantities 
Values 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1,982 
5,105,000 
2,249 
3,290,000 
Venezuelan Mexico Colombia U.S. ROW 
Imports Quantities 
Values 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
331 
589,000 
Exports Quantities 
Values 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
103 
35,000 
u.s. Mexico Venezuela Colombia ROW 
Imports 
Exports 
Quantities 
Values 
Quantities 
Values 
7,840 
14,347,000 
1,899 
3,778,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
234 
101,000 
0 
0 
63,699 
102,638,000 
3,092 
10,197,000 
Quantities in tons.; values in U.S. dollars .~ 
-
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Table A-2.3	 Tariffs and Tariff Changes for the Simulation Model for 
Pepper (ad-valorem) 
Importer Exporter 
Colombia Mexico 
Venezuela 
U.s. 
Row 
Mexico Colombia 
Venezuela 
U.s. 
Row 
Venezuela Mexico 
Colombia 
U.S. 
Row 
U.s. Mexico 
Venezuela 
Colombia 
Row 
ROW Mexico 
Venezuela 
U.s. 
Colombia 
Initial Tariffs 
0.15 
0 
0.15 
0.15 
0.184 
0.184 
0.184 
0.184 
0.15 
0 
0.15 
0.15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
GATI/NAFTA G-3 
-0.0225 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
-0.15 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
-0.0276 
-0.0276 
-0.184 
-0.0276 
-0.184 
-0.184 
-0.184 
-0.0276 
-0.0225 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
-0.15 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-
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Table A-2.4 Quantities, Prices, and Elasticities for the Simulation Model 
for Cotton <average 1991-1993) 
Colombia Mexico Venezuela U.S. ROW 
Production 1 
Consumption 1 
Total Exports 1 
Total Imports 1 
Producers Price 2 
Consumer Price 2 
Price Trans. Elas.* 
Supply Elasticity 
Demand Elasticity 
115,000 
95,191 
33,233 
13,424 
869 
1,391 
1 
0.689 
-0.2 
86,000 
195,418 
26,283 
135,701 
1,018 
1,545 
0.9 
0.6 
-0.6 
65,941 
86,665 
3,719 
24,443 
363 
605 
0.5 
0.5 
-0.4 
3,629,333 
2,270,900 
1,373,500 
15,067 
1,254 
1,322 
1 
0.74 
-0.2 
14,599,393 
15,847,493 
17,696 
1,265,796 
994.8 
1,484.7 
1 
0.3 
-0.2 
1 Tons. 
2 U.S. dollars 
.. Price Transmission Elasticity 
-
,. 
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Table A-2.5	 Trade Data for the Simulation Model for Cotton <average 
1991-1993) 
Colombian Mexico Venezuela U.S. ROW 
Imports 
Exports 
Quantities 
Values 
Quantities 
Values 
13,424 
19,181,000 
33,233 
46,233,000 
0 
0 
405 
414,000 
0 
0 
12,246 
19,342,000 
8,569 
12,296,000 
295 
25,000 
Mexican Colombia Venezuela U.S. ROW 
Imports 
Exports 
Quantities 
Values 
Quantities 
Values 
135,701 
149,174,000 
26,283 
40,609,000 
412 
542,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
126,590 
136,800,000 
22,007 
34,080,000 
Venezuelan Mexico Colombia U.S. ROW 
Imports 
Exports 
Quantities 
Values 
Quantities 
Values 
24,443 
37,439,000 
3,719 
2,248,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11,880 
18,460,000 
0 
0 
2,480 
3,719,000 
0 
0 
u.s. Mexico Venezuela Colombia ROW 
Imports 
Exports 
Quantities 
Values 
Quantities 
Values 
15,067 
16,980,000 
1,373,500 
1,815,846,0 
00 
11,810 
11,615,000 
145,022 
161,183,000 
0 
0 
2,314 
2,860,000 
0 
0 
9,367 
12,875,000 
-
Quantities in tons.; values in U.S. dollars 
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Table A-2.6	 Tariffs and Tariff Changes for the Simulation Model for 
Cotton (ad-valorem) 
Importer Exporter Initial Tariffs GATT/NAFTA Total Libln. 
Colombia Mexico 
Venezuela 
U.s. 
Row 
0.15 
0 
0.15 
0.15 
-0.0225 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
-0.15 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
Mexico Colombia 
Venezuela 
U.S. 
Row 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
-0.015 
-0.015 
-0.1 
-0.015 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.015 
Venezuela Mexico 
Colombia 
U.S. 
Row 
0.15 
0 
0.15 
0.15 
-0.0225 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
-0.15 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
U.S. Mexico 
Venezuela 
Colombia 
Row 
0.045 
0 
0 
0.027 
-0.045 
0 
0 
-0.004 
-0.045 
0 
0 
-0.004 
ROW Mexico 
Venezuela 
U.S. 
Colombia 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-
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Table A-2.7 Quantities, Prices, and Elasticities for the Simulation Model 
for Dried Leguminous Vegetables <average 1991-1993) 
Colombia Mexico Venezuela U.s. ROW 
Production 1 178,000 1,347,000 47,000 1,183,764 53,037,569 
Consumption 1 264,284 1,338,581 138,665 782,998 53,268,805 
Total Exports 1 9,434 44,333 1,718 478p93 228,406.5 
Total Imports 1 95,718 35,914 93,383 77~27 459,642.5 
Producers Price 2 449.2 522.2 318.6 441 282.4 
Consumer Price 2 719.3 792.4 531 501 421.5 
Price Trans. Elas.... 1 1 1 1 1 
Supply Elasticity 0.065 0.7 0.5 0.81 0.5 
Demand Elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
-

1 Tons. 
2 U.S. dollars 
... Price Transmission Elasticity 
l 
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Table A-2.8	 Trade Data for the Simulation Model for Dried Leguminous 
Vegetables (average 1991-1993) 
Colombian 
Imports 
Exports 
Quantities 
Values 
Quantities 
Values 
Mexico 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Venezuela 
1,320 
495,000 
9,394 
6,719,000 
U.S. 
11,583 
3,272,000 
0 
0 
ROW 
82,815 
23,650,000 
40 
67,000 
Mexican 
Imports 
Exports 
Quantities 
Values 
Quantities 
Values 
Colombia 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Venezuela 
0 
0 
352 
180,000 
U.S. 
21,638 
12,833,000 
16,021 
11,922,000 
ROW 
14,276 
5,011,000 
27,960 
23,031,000 
Venezuelan 
Imports Quantities 
Values 
Exports Quantities 
Values 
Mexico 
467 
245,000 
0 
0 
Colombia 
7,241 
5,625,000 
1,637 
906,000 
U.S. 
20,316 
9,170,000 
0 
0 
ROW 
65,359 
31,123,000 
81 
7,000 
u.s. Mexico Venezuela 
Imports Quantities 10,283 0 
Values 7,398,000 0 
Exports Quantities 31,417 9,497 
Values 17,449,000 3,592,000 
Quantities in tons.; values in U.S. dollars 
Colombia 
0 
0 
7,705 
2,511,000 
ROW 
67,544 
38,725,000 
429,974 
216,445,000 
~ 
-
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Table A-2.9	 Tariffs and Tariff Changes for the Simulation Model for 
Dried Leguminous Vegetables (ad-valorem) 
" 
Importer Exporter Initial Tariffs GATT/NAFTA Total Libln. 
Colombia Mexico 
Venezuela 
U.S. 
Row 
0.15 
0 
0.15 
0.15 
-0.0225 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
-0.15 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
Mexico Colombia 
Venezuela 
U.S. 
Row 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
-0.015 
-0.015 
-0.1 
-0.015 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.015 
Venezuela Mexico 
Colombia 
U.S. 
Row 
0.15 
0 
0.15 
0.15 
-0.0225 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
-0.15 
0 
-0.0225 
-0.0225 
U.S. Mexico 
Venezuela 
Colombia 
Row 
0.042 
0 
0 
0.052 
-0.042 
0 
0 
-0.008 
-0.042 
0 
0 
-0.008 
ROW Mexico 
Venezuela 
U.S. 
Colombia 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-0.02 
-
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Table A-2.10 Quantities, Prices, and Elasticities for the Simulation Model 
for Sesame Seed <average 1991-1993) 
Colombia Mexico Venezuela U.S. ROW 
Production 1 6,667 33,333 25,000 1,615 2,367,718 
Consumption 1 4,480 11,965 15,215 36,138 2,366,535 
Total Exports 1 3,656 26,599 9,863 1,615 21,105.5 
Total Imports 1 1,469 5,231 78 36,138 19,922.5 
Producers Price 2 479 811 431 612 
Consumer Price 2 767 1,231 719 1,091 913.4 
Price Trans. Elas.* 0.7 0.75 0.4 1 0.7 
Supply Elasticity 0.256 0.5 0.42 0.55 0.6 
Demand Elasticity -0.65 -0.27 -0.27 -0.29 -0.4 
1 Tons. 
2 U.S. dollars 
.. Price Transmission Elasticity 
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Table A-2.11 Trade Data for the Simulation Model for Sesame Seed 
(average 1991-1993) 
Colombian 
Imports 
Exports 
Quantities 
Values 
Quantities 
Values 
Mexico 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Venezuela 
1,469 
800,000 
77 
53,000 
U.S. 
0 
0 
48 
42,000 
ROW 
0 
0 
3,531 
2,709,000 
Mexican 
Imports 
Exports 
Quantities 
Values 
Quantities 
Values 
Colombia 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Venezuela 
2,166 
1,176,000 
0 
0 
U.S. 
418 
168,000 
17,442 
22,836,000 
ROW 
2,647 
1,548,000 
9,157 
9,897,000 
Venezuelan 
Imports Quantities 
Values 
Exports Quantities 
Values 
Mexico 
0 
0 
1,938 
1,246,000 
Colombia 
78 
55,000 
1,505 
1,007,000 
U.S. 
0 
0 
133 
118,000 
ROW 
0 
0 
6,287 
4,720,000 
r 
u.s. Mexico Venezuela 
Imports Quantities 17,835 149 
Values 22,765,000 146,000 
Exports Quantities 355 0 
Values 162,000 0 
Quantities in tons.; values in U.S. dollars 
Colombia 
43 
41,000 
0 
0 
ROW 
18,111 
19,355,000 
1,260 
1,600,000 
-
'" 
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Table A-2.12 Tariffs and Tariff Changes for the Simulation Model for 
Sesame Seed (ad-valorem) 
L 
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